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In an attempt to account for the nature and operations of our mental 
states and processes, at least two basic schools of thought have emerged. 
The account that has been historically entrenched into our patterns of 
thought is formally known as dualism. While this method of 
explanation is a comfortable one for us to accept for several reasons, it 
also happens that it encounters fundamental philosophical difficulties 
which I presently hold to be insoluble. 
Dualism may seem like an attractive theory to us for three reasons, 
according to Paul Churchland in his book, Matter and Conciousness, 
puublished in 1984 by MIT Press. The first of these, which was alluded 
to earlier, is the argument from religion. According to Churchland, 
" ... if one is to be consistent, to consider disbelieving dualism is to 
consider disbelieving one's religious heritage" (p. 13). Most religious 
views posit the existence of a non,physical soul which is the basis of 
our personhood (if you will). Secondly, there are those who will argue 
from introspection, and point out that what we perceive when we think 
is not electrochemical activity, but rather sensations. Our thoughts, 
then, seem to us to bear little similarity to neurophysiological states, 
and hence, the argument goes, our mental activity must somehow 
involve a non,physical type of stuff. Finally, the dualists will call into 
play the argument from irreducibility. That is, they say, there seems to 
us to be cases in which our particular mental states c;:ould not be 
adequately explained by a purely physical account. Upon reflection, it 
is easily seen that our thoughts and emotions contain a unique 
phenomenological character which (it seems) could not possibly be 
captured by a purely formal signal. For these reasons, dualism may seem 
like a plausible approach to explain such things; however, a careful 
investigation will reveal that this is not really the case. 
The first branch of dualism to be examined is substance dualism. On 
this view, says Churchland, "each mind is a distinct non,physical thing, 
an individual package of non,physical substance ... whose identity is 
separate from any physical body to which it may be temporarily 
attached" (p. 7). It is this non,physical stuff, the substance dualist 
claims, that constitutes the essence of our mental activity. However, 
the substance dualist will also want to maintain that this non,physical 
substance is somehow causally related in the determination of our 
observable behavior. At this point, problems arise for the substance 
dualist. Specifically, he must overcome the long,standing dilemma in 
philosophy known as the mind,body problem. Put more clearly, the 
question may be asked: How is it possible that a non,physical substance 
could exert a causal influence over a physical one? Our current 
conception of causation is entirely mechanistic, and the substance 
dualist must somehow provide an explanation of just how this brand of 
~: 
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causation might take place. Unless such a clarification can be brought 
to light, substance dualism will remain impaired in that respect. In 
addition to this, Churchland notes an additional problem with this 
view, which can be summarized as follows: If our unique mental 
capacities were truly separate and distinct from the physical processes 
of the brain, one would expect that the deterioration of or damage to 
the physical brain would be essentially inert with respect to the 
maintenance and consistency of our unique mental states. And yet 
science has proven this not to be the case. That is, there are numerous 
cases in which the input of certain substances into the body will 
produce certain kinds of mental phenomenon in the recipient which 
otherwise would not have been obtained. Thus, this non-physical 
substance must be susceptible to alteration by physical agents. 
Therefore, the substance dualist's claim that this non-physical 
substance is separate and distinct from the brain proper is inherently 
suspect (p. 20). 
In an attempt to avoid these problems, the property dualists have 
advanced a slightly different claim. According to this variation, 
" ... while there is no substance here to be dealt with beyond the 
physical brain, the brain has a special set of properties possessed by no 
other type of physical object" (p. 10). The brain, then, has these non­
physical problems of believing that so-and-so, of being in pain, and 
furthermore these properties do not lend themselves to reduction into 
purely physical processes according to the property dualists (Ibid.). 
On the surface, property dualism seems to avoid the problems 
encountered by substance dualism, for some property dualists maintain 
that" ... while mental phenomena are caused to occur by the various 
activities of the brain, they do not have any causal effects in turn." By 
denying that mental phenomena have any causal effect on behavior, 
the property dualist avoids having to explain the nature of the causal 
link between non-physical events and physical ones. He thus seemingly 
circumvents this problem that the substance dualist encountered. 
Notice, though, that the property dualist is positing the existence of an 
entirely physical brain that has certain non-physical content which 
can~ot be explained by appeal to physical processes. This does not seem 
to make sense. If the brain is entirely physical, one would expect that 
all events occurring within could, at least in principle, be explained 
using a method entirely mechanistic in kind. But the property dualist 
says that this is not so. The property dualist's position is therefore 
internally inconsistent. 
In addition to all of this, virtually all forms of dualism will at the 
outset be forced to overcome the implications of a philosophical 
principle known formally as Ockham's razor. The principle can be 
stated briefly: Do not posit 
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a given phenomenon "X" can be explained equally well by two 
competing theories, and one entails the existence of a greater number 
of entities, we should be inclined to accept the theory that supposes a 
fewer number of entities. The other prevailing view on the nature of 
mental activity is materialism, and it posits only one entity. Therefore, 
if we are to accept Ockham's principle, and if the explanatory capacity 
of both dualism and materialism is presumed to be equal, then we 
automatically have reason to prefer the latter theory to the former. 
In short, it can be seen that if some form of dualism is to be 
rationally maintained, the aforementioned problems must somehow be 
resolved. The substance dualist's position commits him to a new notion 
of causation--one with which we are not presently familiar, and 
furthermore one for which no empirical evidence can be cited (not even 
in principle). It is therefore difficult to see just how such a position 
might gather any convincing evidence that allows us to draw 
conclusions about its truth or falsity. Generally, when we speak of 
having evidence in favor of (or against) a certain claim, we speak 
implicitly about situations and states of affairs which, if apprehended 
by another rational person, would count as evidence for him (or her) as 
well. At present, the dualist account does not square very well with our 
ideas about the evidential relations between certain events. In addition, 
given the progress that has been made in the neurosciences, would it 
be more reasonable for us to conclude that eventually they will lead to 
an entirely mechanical explanation of the nature of mental activity, or 
to conclude that we must posit non,physical substance in order to do 
so? In other words, what reasons do we have for thinking that in the 
long run, a non.physical substance will be necessary to adequately 
account for our unique characteristics as humans? As modem science 
continues to progress, these reasons will continue to be eliminated. 
Of course, to show dualism to be incorrect, it does not thereby follow 
necessarily that materialism is correct. However, Ockham's principle 
suggests that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the simpler 
theory should prevail. Thus far, no such evidence in favor of the dualist 
view has yet presented itself. 
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